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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1

Did the Ninth Circuit err by failing to hold that the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996 is a content-neutral regulation aimed at the secondary effects child pornography has
on the welfare of children?

2.

Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad when the language of the statute provides
adequate notice of what is prohibited and therefore eliminates the risk of suppressing
protected forms of speech?
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In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 2001

John Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al.,

Petitioners,
V.

Free Speech Coalition,

Respondents

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Petitioners, John Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al., respectfully submits this brief and
requests that this Court REVERSE the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit on the constitutionality of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 198
F.3d 1083 (9th Cir 1999).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the constitutionality of federal statutes de novo Elder v Holloway^
510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
preliminary Statement
On January 27, 1997, the Free Speech Coalition (“FSC”) filed a compliant in the
Northern District of California. (Joint Appendix (“J.A.") 1.) The FSC contended that the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”) is unconstitutional as a result of its alleged
infringement of First and Fifth Amendment rights. (J.A. 2.) The Complaint sought a pre
enforcement injunction and declaratory relief to allow the continued production, distribution, and
presentation of the sexually explicit materials proscribed by the CPPA. (J.A. 9.) Both parties
filed cross motions for summary judgment. (J.A 14, 16.) On August 12, 1997, the district court
ruled that the CPPA satisfies constitutional standards and is therefore constitutional as written.
Free Speech Coalition

Janet Reno, 1997 U.S Dist. LEXIS 12212 (N D CA. Aug. 12, 1997).

Thereafter, FSC appealed the district court’s adverse ruling. (J.A. 87.) On December 17, 1999,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on the
constitutionality of the statutory language of the CPPA. Free Speech Coalition v. Janet Rpnr.
198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999). This Court granted certiorari on January 22, 2001

John

Ashcroft, Attorney General v The Free Speech CoaHtion I21 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
Statement of Fact.s
For over twenty years, Congress has attempted to prevent the exploitation of children by
eradicating the highly profitable and highly organized market for child pornography and
prostitution. Free Speech, 198F.3dat 1087. In 1977, Congress recognized child pornography as
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a grave social concern and passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act,
the first in a series of laws aimed at stopping child pornography and exploitation. Free Speech,
198 F.3d at 1087. Congress amended this law periodically to combat the resolve and elusive
nature of child pornographers, and to tailor the law within the decisions by this Court regarding
child pornography Id at 1087-1089.
The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 criminalized the use
of a minor in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depictions of such
conduct. Id at 1087. Due to shortcomings in the ability to convict under this act, as well as this
Court’s ruling in New York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747 (1982), Congress enacted the Child
Protection Act of 1984 The Child Protection Act dispensed with the requirement that the
prohibited material be considered obscene and also raised the age limit for protecting children
involved in production of child pornography from sixteen years to eighteen years of age. Free
Speech, 198 F 3d at 1088 Congress intended to make it clear that the depiction of children
engaged in sexual activity was unlawful even if it did not meet the adult obscenity standard. Id
Technological advancements resulted in the Child Protection and Enforcement Act of
1988. Id This law criminalized the use of a computer to transport, distribute, or receive child
pornography Id Following this Court’s decision in Osborne v. Ohio. 495 U.S. 103 (1990),
Congress amended this law to punish the production or importation of sexually explicit
depictions of minors and mandated restitution for victims of child pornography The purpose of
this statute was to protect real children from exploitation. Free Speech 198 F 3d at 1088.
However, due to sweeping advances in computer technology, the sanctity of childhood
innocence became susceptible to corruption in the form of virtual pornography. In 1996,
Congress continued the effort to stop “kiddie porn,” by passing the CPPA. Id at 1089. The
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CPPA expanded the existing law to combat the use of computer technology to produce
pornography containing images that resemble children. Free Speech I98F,3dat 1089. The
goal of the CPPA is to protect children by preventing the use of sexually explicit computer
images to entice actual children to engage in degrading acts, as well as to stifle the impetus of
pedophiles and sexual perverts who would otherwise be encouraged by the availability of such
reprehensible materials. Id at 1089.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The CPPA’s language and purpose constitutionally permits the government to regulate
both real and virtual child pornography. The statute ensures that young children will not be
exploited through child pornography nor become victims of sexual abuse at the hands of
pedophiles and child molesters. By only targeting the secondary effects of child pornography on
society, and providing alternative means of expressing child sexuality, the statute preserves the
free flow of information into the marketplace of ideas. As such, the CPPA is a content-neutral
statute because it serves a substantial state interest and is justified without reference to the
content of the speech. Even if the CPPA is considered to be a content-based restriction on
speech, it survives strict scrutiny. It is a narrowly tailored statute that serves the compelling
interests of the state in protecting children.
There is no reason to strike down the CPPA as unconstitutionally vague The language of
the statute provides the ordinary viewer of sexually explicit material adequate notice of the kinds
of images to avoid. In addition, the interaction of the applicable legal standards provides further
safeguards to the average person viewing suspect images. The legal standards, specifically, the
precise definitions of terms in the statute, the scienter requirement, and the affirmative defense.
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all work in concert to minimize the danger that the CPPA might be enforced in an arbitrary or
discriminatory fashion by overzealous police officers or prosecutors.
The C PPA’s criminalization of the transport and possession of artificial or “virtual” child
pornography is not an overbroad and unconstitutional reach by Congress. This Court has
sanctioned congressional efforts to contain the evil of child pornography not just because of its
impact on specific, identifiable “real” children, but also for the equally compelling objective of
eliminating the child pornography trade in general. The Ninth Circuit erred by disregarding
congressional findings that were made to justify the passage of the CPPA in order to reach the
conclusion that the latter objective is overwhelmed by First Amendment concerns. The Ninth
Circuit impermissibly ignored its duty to give substantial deference to Congress’ findings, which
support the notion that virtual child pornography, even though it may not involve the use of
actual children, is intended to prevent harm to actual children. The government’s interest in
addressing these forms of child pornography is no less powerful than in instances where an
actual child is used and abused during the production process. The existence of a tiny fraction of
material that could conceivably qualify for First Amendment protection but that could fall under
the purview of the CPPA does not render the statute as a whole substantially overbroad.
ARGUMENT
I

THE CPPA IS A CONTENT-NEUTRAL STATUTE THAT AUTHORIZES THE
REGULATION OF BOTH REAL AND VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
BECAUSE IT SERVES COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTERESTS BY
TARGETING THE HARMFUL SECONDARY EFFECTS OF CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY
The government can impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of

protected speech, so long as the regulation is justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, is designed to serve a substantial government interest, and does not
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unreasonably limit alternative methods of communication. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters,
Inc., 475 U.S 41, 47 (1986) (emphasis added). In Renton, this Court held a regulation
prohibiting the location of adult theaters to be content-neutral because it did not ban adult
theaters altogether, but merely sought to combat the harmful secondary effects of such theaters
on the local community. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-48. Similarly, the CPPA is content-neutral
because it combats the dangerous secondary effects of child pornography on this nation’s
children while allowing ample alternative forms of expression. Thus, the first step in the
analysis is to determine if the purpose of the regulation is justified without reference to the
content of the speech and principally aimed at the secondary effects of speech. Id at 48.
A.

The CPPA Advances Compellina Government Interests in Reaulatina the
Secondan/ Effects of Child Pornography On Actual Children.

In Ferber. three principal considerations led this Court to conclude that the government
has a compelling interest in regulating child pornography: (1) the government’s interest in
"safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor;” (2) the "distribution of
photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to sexual
abuse of children;” and (3) the value of permitting material of "children engaged in lewd sexual
conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis'' 458 U.S. at 764-765. Based on these
considerations, this Court held child pornography to be a distinct category of expression that
lacks First Amendment protection whether it is obscene or merely indecent. Id at 757-762.
Consequently, the material covered by the CPPA is unprotected speech.
The considerations that led the Court to hold that child pornography involving actual
children is unprotected, are readily applicable to virtual depictions of child pornography that are
"virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer” from actual children engaged in child
pornography, (J.A. 25.) The CPPA effectively serves five compelling government interests
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stemming from the secondary effects of child pornography; (1) to prevent the seduction of
children through the use of child pornography; (2) to eliminate material that pedophiles and child
molesters can use to whet their appetites, (3) to prevent sexual abuse of children in the
production of child pornography; (4) to extinguish the market for child pornography; and (5) to
protect the psychological well being of children
I

Congress has a compelling interest in preventing children from sexual
exploitation.

One of Congress’ underlying reasons for enacting the CPPA was to counter the
secondary effects child pornography has on viewers. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at § III (Aug 2, 1996)
Congress found that “child pornography is often used as a part of a method of seducing other
children into sexual activity.” (J.A. 25.) Child pornography degrades and exploits the weakest
and most vulnerable members of society - our children Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at § IV(A).
Congress noted that “synthetic pornography” stimulates the same anti-social responses as
“traditional” child pornography and, therefore, can be used as an effective weapon by pedophiles
to seduce children. (J.A. 25.) This Court explicitly recognized in Osborne that a state has a valid
interest in preventing pedophiles from using child pornography to seduce children. 495 U S. at
111. Citing the Attorney General’s Report, this Court found that a “child who is reluctant to
engage in sexual activity with an adult

. can sometimes be convinced by viewing other

children having ‘fim’ participating in the activity.” id, at 111 n. 7 Furthermore, an adult does
not have a First Amendment right to display child pornography to children In Ferber. this Court
noted that the First Amendment does not "extend its immunity to speech or writing used as an
integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.” 458 U S. at 761-762 (citing
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co . 336 U S. 490, 498 (1949)). Thus, the First Amendment
does not protect child pornography that is used by pedophiles or child molesters Therefore, the
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government has a compelling interest in regulating virtual child pornography and keeping it out
of the hands of sexual predators because the danger to children is as great with “synthetic”
pornography as it is with “traditional” pornography.
2.

Congress has a compelling interest in eliminating materials used by sexual
predators to whet their sexual appetites.

To combat child pornography, the government is justified in prohibiting the personal
viewing of child pornography. Osborne. 495 U.S at 110. Congress realized that synthetic child
pornography that is virtually indistinguishable from real child pornography, could be used to
encourage child molestation and pedophilia by “whet[ting] [the sexual molester’s] own sexual
appetite.” (J.A. 25.) Testimony before Congress confirmed that any kind of child pornography
“can act as an incitement to imitate [sexual molestation] in real life with someone they have
access to and can intimidate not to tell.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at § 1V(A). Pedophiles and child
molesters use child pornography as a “training manual” in acquiring their own deviation. Id^
Such uses of child pornography desensitize the viewer to the harm of sexual abuse or child
exploitation so that it becomes acceptable to the viewer or even preferred (J.A. 25.) Therefore,
virtual and real child pornography encourages the activities of child molesters and pedophiles
and plays a critical role in the vicious cycle of child sexual abuse and exploitation. Sen. Rpt.
104-358, at 1V(A). Thus, the CPPA is necessary to safeguard the physical and psychological
well-being of children. The CPPA addresses a compelling government interest in curbing and
preventing the viewing of child pornography by pedophiles and child molesters, who use child
pornography to whet their sexual appetites.
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^

Conaress has a compelline interest in preventing the sexual abuse of
minors involved in the production of child pornography

By altering a photograph to make it impossible to show that a real child was ever
involved in its creation, virtual child pornography allows child pornographers to hide the sexual
abuse of a child. United States v, Hilton. 167 F.3d61.73nst Cir. 1999^ In Hilton, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals found that without the “appears to be” language in the CPPA, real child
pornographers could hide behind the inaccurate presumption that real children were not used in
the production ot child pornography, and thus effectively frustrate the government’s efforts to
prevent the sexual exploitation of real children. Id Because computers can create images that
are virtually indistinguishable from images of real children, a defendant charged with producing,
distributing, or possessing child pornography could argue that the government failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that actual children were used. Id Without the “appears to be”
language in the CPPA, a substantial loophole in the prohibitions on child pornography using
actual children would be created; a loophole that basically handicaps law enforcement in their
mission to protect children from sexual abuse. Id; United States v. Mento. 231 F.3d 912, 920
(4th Cir, 2000) (the court noted that technological advances have created an enforcement
problem when all that can be proved is that the actor “appears to be” that of a minor). Preventing
the disguised sexual abuse of children is a compelling government interest that is directly related
to the rationale espoused in Ferber for protecting children from sexual abuse.
4

Congress has a compelling interest in drying up the child pornotJraphv
market.

Congress’ findings follow this Court’s holding in Osborne: that prohibiting virtual child
pornography would encourage owners of all child pornography to destroy those materials. See
495 U.S. at 111. It is reasonable to conclude that penalizing possession will encourage the
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destruction of child pornography, and thus will decrease demand for the product and thereby
“dry up the market” for child pornography. Osborne. 495 U.S. at 109-110. This Court
recognized that in order to combat child pornography, “the government is justified in not only
driving it from the marketplace, but prohibiting the possession and personal viewing of these
materials.” Id at 110. In fact, in Ferber, this Court recognized that the dissemination of child
pornography provides an economic motive to continue the production of child pornography.
Feite, 458 U.S, at 761. By removing virtual child pornography as a defense to possessing and
viewing child pornography, the CPPA simultaneously decreases the demand and eliminates the
supply of child pornography. Also, the interest in eliminating the child pornography market both
aids in protecting children from sexual exploitation and eliminates material that is concededly
trivial in nature, id
^

Congress has a compelling interest in protecting the psychological well
being of children

A computer image that includes a recognizable feature of a minor, such as a minor’s face,
is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children.” Id at 759. A computer picture that
includes an image of a recognizable minor invades that minor’s “privacy and reputational
interests and can “haunt the minor for years to come.” (J.A. 25.) The Congressional finding
mirrors the reasoning this Court applied in Ferber to find that the government has a compelling
interest in regulating child pornography. See 458 U.S. at 759-760. There can be no doubt that a
child viewing a computer generated image of herself engaged in sexually explicit activity would
be psychologically harmed by the viewing of the picture. Knowledge that the picture is
circulating over the Internet, or in her community, would compound the psychological damage.
Even if the pictures are fictional, they have the appearance of reality and thus violate the minor’s
privacy interests. Therefore, prohibiting virtual child pornography, like real child pornography.
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is necessary to further the government’s compelling interest to protect the psychological well
being of children from the insidious effects child pornography has on those who view it. Ferber
458 U.S. at 759-760.
The harm caused by virtual child pornography, or visual depictions that are virtually
indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic images of actual
children engaging in sexually explicit conduct, outweighs the competing interests of expressive
conduct. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. As this Court in Renton proscribed the location of adult
theaters to protect the local communities from their harmful effects, the CPPA performs an
analogous function with regard to child pornography. The CPPA proscribes child pornography
to protect this nation’s children from sexual abuse, sexual predators, the child pornography
market, and its detrimental effects on a child’s psychology. While the harm to children is great,
the value of child pornography is “exceedingly modest, if not de minimis " Id at 762.
Consequently, the language of the CPPA targets the harmful secondary effects flowing from the
existence and availability of child pornography, rather than the individual ideas contained in
those images. As such, it prevents sexual exploitation and child abuse, and reaffirms the basic
considerations that led this Court to declare child pornography unconstitutional.
Under Ferber, the CPPA Constitutionally Authorizes the Regulation of Sexually
Explicit Imaaes That Do Not Contain Actual Children.
The Ninth Circuit erred by holding that Congress has “no compelling interest in
regulating sexually explicit materials that do not contain visual images of actual children.” Free
Speech, 198 F.3d at 1092. The Ninth Circuit based part of its decision on the statement in Ferber
that “if it were necessary for literary or artistic value, a person over the statutory age who
perhaps looked younger could be utilized,” 458 U.S. at 763. Also, the Ninth Circuit relied on
the statement in Ferber that the government’s interest is “limited to works that visually depict
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children below a specified age.” 458 U S. at 764. Neither statement relegates the government’s
interest to visual depictions involving actual minors.
The first statement only describes one option available to people under the New York
statute at issue in Ferber. This statement is not a holding that the First Amendment protects
images that are virtually indistinguishable from images of real children engaging in sexually
explicit conduct. The second statement fails to draw a distinction between real children and
pictures of persons who appear to be real children Thus, Ferber does not limit the government’s
interest to regulating only those sexually explicit materials that contain images of actual children.
The Ninth Circuit also erred by concluding that there is no “nexus” between the harm to
real children and computer-generated images. Free Speech. 198 F.3d at 1093-1094. As the Free
Speech dissent notes, before enacting the CPPA, Congress went through “thirteen detailed
legislative findings [and personal testimony] that explain[ed] why virtual child pornography
needs to be prohibited.” Id at 1099. In addition, a substantial amount of evidence from
researchers and prosecutors that testified before the Senate Hearings informed Congress of the
deleterious effects of virtual child pornography.

Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at § IV. These

Congressional findings establish the link between virtual child pornography and harm to children
and should be afforded deference in this determination.
Congressional findings regarding the effects of child pornography on those who view it
are entitled to deference Turner Broadcasting System, Inc, v, F C C.. 512 U S. 622, 655 (1994),
In the First Amendment realm. Congressional deference is given because Congress “is far better
equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon
legislative questions” and out “of respect for [Congress’] authority to exercise the legislative
power.” Id at 655-666
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As stated, Congress compiled detailed findings on the effects of virtual child
pornography on children before enacting the CPPA. This Court should give deference to the
Congressional findings and find that they create a causal link between virtual child pornography
and harm to children. Also, the statements from Ferber that the Ninth Circuit relied on in its
decision, do not proscribe the regulation of the CPPA to sexually explicit depictions of actual
children. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to characterize this Court’s decision in Ferber as
limiting the CPPA’s reach to effects on actual children, and to limit Congress’ power to enact
legislation to combat virtual child pornography.
Furthermore, it would be a mistake to attempt to resolve the question of whether the
CPPA can regulate virtual child pornography by picking out isolated sentences in an opinion that
were addressed to a different question. Two judicial maxims of the federal courts are: (1) never
decide a constitutional question in advance of the necessity of deciding it, and (2) never
formulate a rule of law broader than required by the facts before the court. Ferber. 458 U.S. at
768 n. 20 (citing United States v. Raines. 362 U.S. 17,21(1960)). In Ferber. the facts before
this Court involved only real children The technology to create virtual child pornography was
not available at the time this Court ruled in Ferber. Thus, the constitutionality of virtual child
pornography was not before this Court in Ferber. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to use the
holding in Ferber to declare that the CPPA’s prohibition on virtual child pornography violates
the First Amendment. The crucial part of this Court’s decision in Ferber. is the analysis this
Court applied to determine that child pornography is unconstitutional. As demonstrated, the
analysis in Ferber. is equally applicable here. Thus, virtual child pornography is likewise
unprotected by the First Amendment and Congress can constitutionally regulate such images.
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C.

The CPPA is Narrowly Tailored to Serve A Compelling Government Interest.

When a regulation rests on substantial governmental interests, the next issue is whether
the statute is narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling, content-neutral interests.
Ward V. Rock Asainst Racism. 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). The CPPA “need not be the least
restrictive or least intrusive means” of serving the government’s interest. Id at 798. A statute is
narrowly tailored “so long as the . . . substantia! government interest . . . would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation.” Id at 799. Furthermore, a regulation will be sustained under
the First Amendment so long as it “does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to
further those [governmental] interests.” Turner Broadcasting. 512 U S at 634 Moreover, the
government is generally afforded greater leeway in regulating pornographic depictions of
children. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 756.
Here, the CPPA clearly advances the government’s strong interest in preventing the
harms caused by child pornography and the child pornography industry The government
directly advances these interests by narrowing the range of prescribable material to visual
depictions that are, or appear to be, children engaged in sexual activity. United States v.
Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 650 (11th Cir. 1999). In Acheson, the circuit court reviewed the CPPA
and found it to be narrowly tailored to accomplish its objective. Id at 649-652. The circuit court
noted that the CPPA only prohibits those images that appear to be of children engaged in
sexually explicit conduct as specifically defined by the statute. Id at 651. The CPPA describes
“sexually explicit” conduct to include: “actual or simulated intercourse, oral sex, anal sex,
homosexual or heterosexual sex, bestiality, masturbation, sadistic or masochistic abuse, and
lavicious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) Therefore, the types of
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images regulated are only those that are virtually indistinguishable from the current types of
child pornography found today.
The CPPA further narrows its focus by adequately defining “child pornography” as any
visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct where:
[t]he production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor . . . or
appears to be, a minor ... or, such a visual depiction is advertised, promoted,
presented, described, or distributed [in such a way as to] convey the impression
that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.
18 U.S.C.

2256(8). The circuit court noted that any ambiguity within the definitions regarding

whether the depicted person is a minor is resolved through objective proof such as physical
characteristics, Acheson. 195F.3dat 653 Where physical characteristics leave room for doubt,
a person can be fairly warned by examining whether the work was marketed or advertised as
child pornography. Id This ambiguity is not detrimental to the constitutionality of the CPPA.
In Ferber. the court acknowledge that certain forms of protected speech (i.e. National
Geographic) might be affected by the New York statute in that case. 458 U.S. at 767. Also, in
Osborne, the court noted that the Ohio statute on its face seemed to prohibit “nude” pictures of
minors, and was less narrowly tailored than the statute ruled on in Ferber. 495 U.S. at 114-115.
This Court still held that such ambiguity in the language did not render it invalid. Id Thus, both
Ferber and Osborne support the proposition that when the government regulates child
pornography the statute need not be the most narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means to
achieve that interest.
Therefore, the CPPA is a narrowly tailored statute that directly and materially advances
compelling government interests in regulating the exploitive effects of child pornography. The
CPPA concisely describes the narrow range of images of children engaging in sexually explicit
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conduct it seeks to prohibit. Thus, the CPPA furthers the government’s compelling interest in
protecting children from sexual abuse and exploitation without placing unreasonable restrictions
on other forms of speech protected under the First Amendment.
D.

The CPPA Allows Ample Alternative Channels of Communication.

Finally, a narrowly tailored statute that advances substantial government interests must
provide for alternative channels of communication for it to be considered a constitutional
content-neutral statute. Renton. 457 U S. at 47-48. The CPPA allows ample alternative channels
of communication through the language of the statute and through an affirmative defense. 18
u s e. § 2252A(c). The statute only criminalizes a narrow segment of visual depictions of
children engaged in sexual activity. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2). The CPPA provides an affirmative
defense to persons, like the Respondents, who distribute and produce adult pornography with
people that look like children, as long as they do not “advertise, promote, present, describe, or
distribute the material in such a manner as to convey the impression that it is or contains a visual
depiction of a minor engaged in sexual activity” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c). Thus, protected speech,
such as that which the Respondents claim to produce and distribute, is completely free from
prosecution or restraint. Accordingly, the statute provides alternative channels for people to
communicate their ideas.
Furthermore, the language of the CPPA allows for the production of literary, scientific, or
educational works that find it necessary to depict children engaged in sexual conduct. The
statute defines an “identifiable minor” to mean an actual minor or one so readily identifiable as
an actual minor that the picture would have a recognizable feature, such as a birthmark. 18
U.S.C. § 2256(9)(ii). Since these types of features would only apply to a visual depiction that is
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virtually indistinguishable from photographs of real children, it would not apply to drawings,
cartoons, sculptures, or paintings that depict youthful-looking people in sexual poses.
Also, the CPPA does not ban the dissemination of a particular expressive idea regarding
the sexuality of children; it only prohibits the use and production of hard-core child pornography
Ferber, 458 U S at 763 Consequently, the CPPA does not apply to visual depictions in which
sexually explicit conduct between children is taking place, so long as the visual depiction of the
explicit sexual conduct is not shown. Therefore, what the CPPA really prohibits is speech that is
generally without First Amendment protection, or speech whose value is “exceedingly modest, if
not <Je minimis.'' Id at 757
Accordingly, the incidental harms on the speech are outweighed by the government’s
interest in regulating child pornography Therefore, the CPPA must be found to be a contentneutral regulation because it seeks to prohibit a particular practice, not because of its expressive
value, but due to its harmful secondary efiFects. Furthermore, the CPPA is narrowly tailored to
further the government’s interests while permitting ample alternative means of communication.
II

EVEN IF THE CPPA IS CONSIDERED A CONTENT-BASED REGULATION, IT
SURVIVES STRICT SCRUTINY BECAUSE IT IS NARROWLY TAILORED TO
SERVE A COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST.
A regulation that restricts speech based on its content is ordinarily subject to strict

scrutiny and may be upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest. Boos v. Barry. 485 U S. 312, 321 (1988). It is understood, though, that the “right to
free speech is not absolute at ail times and under all circumstances.” Chaplinskv v. New
Hampshire, 315 U S 568, 571 (1942). Furthermore, there are “certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitution[al] problem [such as] lewd and obscene [utterances].”
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Chaplinskv. 315 U S. at 571-572 (footnote omitted). The social benefit of such speech is of
such slight value as to be clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. Id at
572. Real and virtual child pornography is a certain form of expression, the prohibition and
punishment of which, should not raise any constitutional concerns, since the value of such
speech is de minimis Ferber. 458 U.S. at 762.
A.

The Government Has Compelling Interests in Regulating Child PornoRraphy

When determining whether a content-based statute is constitutional, the statute must be
found to address compelling government interests. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. The Ninth Circuit
below held that the CPPA could not justify the government’s compelling interests because
Ferber required (he statute address harm to real, not virtual, children. Free Speech. 198 F.3d at
1091-1095. The analysis in the preceding sections demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit erred in
holding that the government has no compelling interest in regulating virtual child pornography.
supra part 1(A), (B), (C). What remains consistent between the Ninth Circuit’s analysis and
the argument presented here is that the regulation and elimination of child pornography is a
compelling government interest. See Free Speech. 198 F.3d at 1091. Therefore, the only
question is whether the CPPA is more extensive than necessary to serve that interest
B.

The CPPA is Narrowly Tailored to Advance Compelling Government Interests.

To pass constitutional scrutiny, a particular anti-child pornography statute must be
“adequately defined ” Hilton. 167 F.3d at 69 (citing Ferber. 458 U S. at 764) As stated, the
CPPA’s narrow definitions of sexually explicit conduct and child pornography focus the statute
on an exceedingly narrow range of images. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2256(2), (8) Furthermore, the
CPPA’s definition of an identifiable minor is so narrow that any attempt to further specify it
would render the statute unreasonable and impracticable to enforce. Any ambiguity in the

18

contested sections of the CPPA is resolved by examining the physical characteristics of the child
image used in the pornography, and the manner in which the image is described, displayed, or
advertised.

supra part 1(C). Therefore, Congress intended the language “appears to be” and

“conveys the impression” to reach a narrow range of depictions that are “virtually
indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic images of actual
children engaged is sexually explicit conduct.” (J.A. 25.) Accordingly, the challenged
provisions of the CPPA are constitutional even if they trigger strict scrutiny, because they are
narrowly tailored to protect children from sexual exploitation. Furthermore, as demonstrated,
there are no less restrictive means of advancing the government’s compelling interest in
protecting children from sexual abuse and exploitation. See supra part 1(C). Therefore, even if
the CPPA is considered a content-based statute it survives strict First Amendment scrutiny.
Ill

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY HOLDING THE CPPA
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERBROAD BECAUSE THE
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE PROVIDES ADEQUATE NOTICE OF WHAT IS
PROHIBITED AND THEREFORE ELIMINATES THE RISK OF SUPPRESSING
PROTECTED FORMS OF SPEECH
The void for vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are closely related because an

imprecise law may capture protected conduct at its edges. Village of Hoffman Est. v. Flipside,
455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982). Where the challenged provision “abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic
First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms” and
understandably generates cause for concern. Grayned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 109
(1972). Because liberty is the most exalted of American ideals, restrictions on liberty must be
spelled out with sufficient clarity to put citizens on notice of what conduct is prohibited and with
enough definiteness to limit arbitrary law enforcement. Koleanderv. Lawson. 461 U.S. 352, 357
(1983). In the instant case, the CPPA easily surmounts the obstacle of vagueness because the

19

statute itself defines the criminal offense with enough certainty to put a reasonable person on
notice that possessing images appearing to be children engaged in sexually explicit conduct is
illegal- In addition, the affirmative defense and scienter requirements included in the statute are
significant procedural safeguards against improper enforcement of the law.
The overbreadth doctrine allows a litigant to challenge a statute’s possible direct and
indirect burdens on speech. American Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1499-1500 (11th
Cir, 1990). Notwithstanding, there are some First Amendment freedoms that are more sensitive
than others. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. 505 US. 377, 383-385 (1992). Simply put, some types
of speech make up no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and thus may be freely regulated
because of their constitutionally proscribable content, id Child pornography is an example of
this type of unprotected speech. Ferber. 458 US. at 763. The overbreadth doctrine is designed
to protect the public from the chilling effect an overbroad statute has on protected speech, as
opposed to unprotected speech. Nationalist Movement v. City of Cummins, 934. F.2d 1482,
1485 (11 th Cir, 1991), Also, the overbreadth doctrine requires that a statute’s overbreadth be
real and substantial in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. Broadrick v Oklahoma.
413 U S. 601, 613 (1973). The CPPA undoubtedly captures a broad range of images falling
squarely within the well-established parameters of constitutionally proscribable child
pornography ^ Acheson. 195 F.3d at 651

In contrast, sexually explicit images falling close

to the line separating adult pornography and unprotected child pornography are outside the most
sensitive areas of speech vital to the free expression of ideas. Id Thus, the range of ostensibly
protectable images is exceedingly minor compared to the range of easily identifiable and
constitutionally proscribable conduct under the CPPA. Id The legitimate scope of the CPPA
therefore far exceeds the risk of impermissible applications and the statute is not overbroad.
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A,

The CPPA Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague Because The Statutory Language
Gives a Person of Reasonable Intelligence Sufficient Guidance to Discern
What Is Prohibited.

The Ninth Circuit erred by holding the CPPA unconstitutionally vague. The standard for
overturning a law on grounds of vagueness turns on whether the statute in question provides a
constitutionally adequate warning to those whose activities it governs. Koleander. 461 U.S. at
357. A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement, li The language of the CPPA
prohibits material that “appears to be” or that “conveys the impression” of minors engaged in
sexual activity. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this language impermissibly defines the criminal
offense because any ordinary person attempting to interpret it would be left guessing about what
is against the law and what is not. However, the CPPA precisely describes the people who may
not be portrayed and the conduct that may not be depicted. 18 U.S.C. § 2256. Therefore, a
person attempting to interpret the statute is aided by ample statutory criteria explicitly
delineating the prohibited images.
1.

There is an objective standard to use in evaluating the kev phrases of the
CPPA

The phrase “appears to be a minor” provides the ordinary viewer of sexually explicit
material adequate notice of what images fall under the purview of the statute. The standard for
determining what “appears to be” a minor is an objective one, Hilton. 167 F.3d at 75. A jury
must decide, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether a reasonable unsuspecting
viewer would consider the depiction to be of an actual individual less than eighteen years of age
engaging in sexual activity. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 75 (citing Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at § 1V(C)). A
“minor” is explicitly defined as a person under the age of eighteen years of age. The class of
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images prohibited by this language is further restricted to “visual depictions” of minors engaged
in specific acts listed in the CPPA, 18 U.S.C.

2256(8). Thus, the ultimate determination that

must be made is whether the person charged with violating the statute could have reasonably
ascertained that the image depicted an individual under the age of eighteen. Objective indicators
exist to warn an ordinary viewer of sexually explicit material of the apparent age of the person
depicted.
The physical characteristics of a person in an image are especially indicative of whether
the person appears to be under eighteen years of age. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 653. Evaluation of
the physical indicia of maturity necessarily requires the use of a common sense standard. It is
reasonable to expect a person of ordinary intelligence to possess the wherewithal to distinguish
between children and adults. The Ninth Circuit incorrectly surmised that a determination of a
person’s age depends too heavily on subjective measures. In fact, the CPPA places the onus on
the jury to reach that conclusion, and in so doing does not limit the inquiry to analysis of purely
subjective matters. Id In making the determination, the jury may of course rely on common
sense expectations, but also should consider objective evidence such as expert testimony about
the apparent age of the depicted person and the way in which the depiction itself was labeled.
Hilton. 167 F.3d at 75. Furthermore, the materials themselves often give some indication of the
actual ages of the participants. This is true where the file name of a sexually explicit photograph
reveals that its content is targeted to the preferences of pedophiles. Therefore, it is clear that a
depicted person’s apparent age may be ascertained by a number of objectively verifiable factors
available to both primary viewers and juries.
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2

The challenged provisions do not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement and thus do not abridge the liberties of innocent parties.

The interaction between the applicable legal standards provides ample safeguards against
inappropriate prosecutions under the CPPA. ^ Hilton. 167 F.3d at 76. First, the CPPA offers
an affirmative defense to its provisions dealing with the production of explicit material made
with persons of suitable age 18 U S.C § 2252A(c). People responsible for the production, sale,
or distribution of sexually explicit material can protect themselves from prosecution by
disclosing the ages of models depicted in their products This provision thus encourages
producers of sexually explicit adult material to promote their wares as legal, thereby minimizing
the risk of prosecution for a person possessing protected material. Acheson. 195 F.3d at 651.
The CPPA makes no attempt to prohibit lawful adult pornography, even if aimed at the interests
and desires of pedophiles, because depictions produced with adult models and labeled as such
are clearly beyond the scope of the CPPA.
Secondly, alleged possession offenders derive even greater protection from unscrupulous
enforcement as a result of the scienter requirement of the CPPA. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(2)(a). The
statute applies only to a person who “knowingly receives or distributes” or “knowingly
possesses” child pornography. 18 U.S.C.

2252A(a)(2); (a)(5)(B). In order to obtain a

conviction, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person knowingly
possessed images of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct Under the “knowingly”
requirement, a person must have purposefully acquired the material with the belief that the
material was of a sexually explicit nature and depicted a person who appears to be a minor.
Thus, a defendant who honestly believes that the individual depicted in the image appears to be
eighteen years old (and is believed by the jury), or who can show that he knew the image was
created by having a youthful-looking adult pose for it, must be acquitted, so long as the image
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was not presented or marketed as if it contained a real minor. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 75. This
determination of a defendant’s knowledge is readily arrived at using any of a number of
objective indicators already mentioned

supra III(A)(1) In addition, these legal standards

not only provide important procedural safeguards against improper enforcement, but also create
an incentive for focusing prosecutorial energy on the heart of the child pornography problem the
pre-pubescent child pornography market. Acheson. 195 F.3d at 552. Because the CPPA
provides multiple layers of protection against unscrupulous prosecution, FSC’s vagueness
challenge clearly falls short of establishing that the statute encourages arbitrary or discriminatory
law enforcement
3.

The present wordine of the statute is the most effective and least
restrictive means of conveying the intent of the law without sacrificing the
goals of Congress.

It is well within Congress’ power to regulate pornography of minors of all ages, infancy
through age of majority Hilton. 167 F 3d at 76 The impetus of the CPPA is the relatively novel
technology-driven strain of the traditional threat posed by child pornography. In order to cast a
wide enough net to ensnare the more elusive computerized child pornography, a statute must
necessarily be flexible enough to meet the challenges created by rapidly evolving technology.
The “appears to be” test is the most efficacious means of doing so. A more precise wording of
the statute, resulting in a narrower class of prohibited images, would essentially limit Congress’
ability to regulate pornography depicting all minors. Defining child pornography to include
images that “appear to be” minors engaged in sexually explicit activity is necessary to achieve
the two goals of the CPPA, which are “the elimination of child pornography and the protection
of children from sexual exploitation.” Pub. L. No. 104-208, § I, 110 Stat. 3009-3027 (1996).
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The “appears to be” test is sufficiently precise to pass constitutional muster and yet
flexible enough to meet the challenges posed by computerized child pornography. Hilton. 167
F,3d at 76. The test is an explicit recognition of the fact that new technologies make it possible
to produce visual depictions of what appear to be children that are virtually indistinguishable
from unretouched photographic images of actual children. 110 Stat, at 3009-3026. The inherent
threat posed by such technology is that pedophiles rely on child pornography to seduce their
victims. Either type of child pornography, virtual or real, becomes a powerful tool in the hands
of a pedophile who can convince a reluctant child to engage in sexual activity by displaying
depictions of other children ‘having fun’ participating in sexual acts. The real danger addressed
by the CPPA is that virtual child pornography will ser\’e this end even more effectively than the
real thing, due to its ease of production and the unlimited scope of manipulation over the subjects
depicted. The best way to eliminate this danger is to prohibit the tools of seduction, images of
children engaged in sexual acts, regardless of the means used in their production: This is
precisely what Congress achieved by adopting a test for defining child pornography that turns on
the age or apparent age of the person depicted. Defining child pornography to encompass
images that “appear to be” of minors engaging in sexually explicit activity is the most effective
means of protecting children from the risk of sexual exploitation.
The Ninth Circuit’s assumption that the articulation of a legal standard requiring
evaluation of the appearance of an image renders the test arbitrary or overly subjective is
misplaced Free Speech. 198 F.3d at 1095 Judges and juries routinely make reasonable
objective assessments of the impression conveyed by a person’s actions or by how an image
“appears,” especially in the context of obscenity cases. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 751 (approved
definition of child pornography banned “simulated” sexual conduct, which in ordinary usage
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means “to have or take the appearance of’), Miller v California. 413 U S. 15, 24 (1973)
(obscenity depends in part on whether material appeals to prurient interest of average person).
The language of the CPPA’s provisions “suitably limit” the reach of the CPPA so that a person
of ordinary intelligence can easily discern what is unlawful conduct.

United States v. Pearl

89 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1246 (N.D. Utah 2000). The statute clearly defines the term “minor.” 18
U.S.C. § 2256. Like the law evaluated in Ferber, the prohibitions of the CPPA are restricted to
visual images id. Moreover, the statute describes in great detail the types of sexually explicit
depictions of children that are forbidden. Id, Consistent with this Court’s statement in Osborne
such limiting language “avoid[s] penalizing persons for viewing or possessing innocuous
photographs of naked children.” 495 U.S. at 114 The language chosen by Congress affords an
ordinary consumer adequate notice of what images to avoid. Moreover, the interaction among
the applicable legal standards prevents inappropriate enforcement by overzealous police officers
or prosecutors. Thus, there is no reason to uphold the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the
language of the CPPA is unconstitutionally vague
B.

The Lanuuaue of the CPPA Does Not Capture So Much Constitutionally
Protected Conduct as to Render the Statute Invalid On Grounds of Overbreadth

The CPPA does not pose substantial problems of overbreadth sufficient to justify
overturning the judgment of Congress. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 71, A statute will not be invalidated
as overbroad unless its overbreadth is real and substantial, judged in relation to the statute’s
plainly legitimate sweep Osborne. 495 U S. at 112. The overbreadth doctrine should be utilized
to strike down a statute on its face only as a last resort. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 769. The Ninth
Circuit apparently disregarded the admonitions of this line of precedent in according undue
weight to the few arguably problematic prosecutions that could occur under the law, as opposed
to the greater number of legitimate applications of the CPPA.
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1,

The CPPA does not prohibit non-obscene sexual expression that deserves
First Amendment protection.

Some categories of child pornography. like obscenity, are unprotected by the First
Amendment Ferber, 458 U.S, at 764, As such, any legislation attempting to regulate child
pornography must adequately define the prohibited conduct. Id, The CPPA adequately defines
the class of images it seeks to prohibit As in Ferber. the harm combated by the CPPA is limited
to harm engendered by works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified
age. The categories of''sexual conduct” are suitably limited and described. 18 U.S.C.
^ 2256(2). The distinction that the New York statute at issue in Ferber only contemplated harm
to ‘Teal” children used in production of child pornography, while the CPPA attempts to preempt
harm to children susceptible to such abuse does not undermine the application of Ferber in
interpreting the CPPA This distinction between the primary and secondary effects of child
pornography on our nation’s children illustrates the logical extension of child pornography
regulation in the technology age. It does not, however, transform virtual child pornography
into meaningful speech and thereby remove it from the class of conduct deemed unworthy of
constitutional protection in Ferber,
The new language of the CPPA was intended to target only a narrow class of images,
visual depictions that are virtually indistinguishable from photographs of actual children
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 68 (citing Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at
n§ 1V(B)). It is clear from the legislative record that the phrase "appears to be” was employed
to extend the prohibition against child pornography from actual photographic images of minors
to the identical type of depiction, images that are virtually indistinguishable from the already
banned depictions, and no further. Id, Therefore, it was Congress’ intent to only extend federal
authority in a limited fashion to a limited subset of visual images, id. Drawings, cartoons, and
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paintings depicting youthful persons in sexually explicit poses plainly lie beyond the reach of
the CPPA because by their very nature they are not virtually indistinguishable from images of
actual minors. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 68 By the same token, the CPPA does not criminalize adult
pornography created with models over the age of majority who look youthful. Congress
expressed the general view that the CPPA does not apply to a depiction produced using adults
engaging in sexual conduct, even where a depicted individual may appear to be a minor. Sen.
Rpt. 104-358, at § IV(C). That view is wholly consistent with this Court s statement in Ferber,
where the Court presumed that if a depiction of children performing sexual acts might be
necessary for literary or artistic reasons, “a person over the statutory age who perhaps looked
younger could be utilized.” 458 U S. at 763. Therefore, the CPPA clearly poses no threat to the
vast majority of artistic expression involving sexual themes, and there is no risk of a chilling
effect on the communication of lawful ideas
2.

The likely number of lawful applications of the CPPA far outweighs the
few arguably problematic prosecutions under the law.

It is inefficient to strike down an entire statute in response to a facia! attack when
potential difficulties can be remedied in future cases through fact-specific as-applied challenges.
Hilton. 167 F.3d at 71. Whatever overbreadth may exist at the edges of a statute is more
appropriately cured through a case-by-case evaluation of the facts in a given case. New York
State Club Assn.. Inc, v. City of New York. 487 U.S. 1, 14(1988). The fact that there is an
inherent difficulty in determining whether a person “appears to be” either seventeen or eighteen
years old does not render the definition overbroad. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 73. The apparent age of a
pre-pubescent child can easily be established through objective proof id
Furthermore, it is extremely unlikely that pro.secutions for sale or possession of images of
youthful looking adults on the cusp of majority would comprise a substantial portion of the
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prosecutions under the CPPA. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 73. Congress, based on the substantial
evidence of expert opinions, determined that the demand driving the child pornography market is
primarily for depictions of pre-pubescent children, which are images falling far from any
constitutional protection. 1^ Thus, it is Congress’ intention to thwart purveyors of child
pornography that cater to pedophiles, who by definition have a predilection for pre-pubertal
children. Sen. Rpt. 104-358. at §§ IV(A), (C), Relying on Congress’ factual predictions, it is
most likely that the vast majority of prosecutions under the “appears to be a minor’ provision
would involve images of pre-pubescent children who otherwise clearly appear to be under the
age of eighteen, Hilton. 167F.3dat74, The possibility of a few conceivably impermissible
applications of the CPPA, such as prosecution for possessing sexual explicit material of adults
who appear to be children, does not warrant condemnation of the statute as a whole. See Id, The
appropriate remedy is reversal of an unconstitutional conviction should the circumstance arise,
not invalidation of the entire statute based on hypothetical abstractions, id.
Moreover, the CPPA does not pose substantial problems of overbreadth sufficient to
justify overturning the judgment of the lawmaking branch of our government When dealing
with a federal statute challenged as overbroad, a federal court has an obligation to construe the
statute so as to avoid constitutional problems. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767. The Court s obligation
to exercise independent judgment when First Amendment rights are implicated is not a license
to replace Congress’ factual predictions with its own. Rather, it is to assure that, in formulating
its judgments. Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence. Turner
Broadcastimt. 520 U.S. at 596. Congress, through the Senate Committee, heard substantial
evidence on the harm to be avoided and the remedial measures to be adopted. Congress
articulated a compelling interest, protection of children, that is served by the CPPA, and
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narrowly tailored the CPPA to that purpose. It is clear that the outlawing of “cyber” child
pornography is intended to, and will, protect “real” children from exploitation and harm. The
statutory definitions, together with Congress’ statements in the legislative record, provide a
precise and limited understanding of the “appears to be” language, which this Court should use
to fashion the controlling interpretation of the CPPA.

3

The compellint; interest in preventing the pernicious secondary effects of
child pornography is sufficient to justify the expansion of federal child
pornography law to prohibit virtual imaues.

In finding the CPPA to be unconstitutionally overbroad, the Ninth Circuit’s primary
reason was that the CPPA no longer focused its justification on the harm to children. Free
Speech. 198 F.3d at 1089. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit erroneously concluded that when
outlawing “visual depictions” that “appear to be of a minor engaged in sexually explicit
conduct,” the CPPA of 1996 impermissibly changed course Id The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
because the justification cited by Congress in passing the CPPA included reference to its impact
on the viewer, that the CPPA was necessarily banning speech based solely on its content. Id at
1091. The perceived shift in the regulatory direction from defining child pornography in terms
of the harm inflicted upon real children to a determination that child pornography is evil in and
of itself, whether or not produced with real children, is the basis of the constitutional challenge
made by the FSC
However, the flaw in this reasoning is revealed when considered in conjunction with the
broadly permissive justifications for allowing Congress to outlaw child pornography approved
by this Court in Ferber and Osborne. Congress and the states are “entitled to greater leeway in
the regulation of pornographic depictions of children ” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756. It is beyond
question that “the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a
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government objective of surpassing importance.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757. It is important to
keep in mind, however, that protection of the actual child exploited to produce a particular
image is not the sole justification for the criminalization of child pornography. Osborne, 495
U.S. at 111. In Osborne, this Court reasoned that the “gravity of the State’s interests in this
context,” including the use of child pornography in the seduction of children, justified a ban on
possession of child pornography, id. Thus, this Court explicitly recognized that prevention of
child exploitation is a compelling interest that need not be limited to protection of children used
to create child pornography, and essentially carved out a unique constitutional treatment for
child pornography law in general. In passing the CPPA of 1996, Congress fashioned the law in
accordance with the justifications previously approved by this Court. The CPPA s expansion of
the prohibited materials to include those that might not in fact be images of actual children does
not, as the Ninth Circuit incorrectly surmised, derive its authority from a compelling
government interest in protecting “cyber” children. Rather, Congress desire to ban virtual
child pornography was based on a factual determination that all child pornography, virtual or
“real,” has the potential to harm actual children at some point in the chain of its production and
use.
It is uncontested that to the extent the CPPA criminalizes visual representations of
“actual” minors engaged in sexual conduct, it falls squarely within the parameters established by
Ferber and Osborne. The compelling interests in deterring direct abuse of children and
destroying the illicit child pornography trade amply justify steps to expand the criminalization
of images to include those of “virtual” as well as actual children, PcB^rl, 89 F, Supp. 2d at
1245. In addition, the sheer impossibility of determining whether an image is “actual” or
“virtual” warrants a prohibition of both. This is especially clear in light of two prominent
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consequences of not doing so: First, if virtual images are not prohibited, technologically savvy
pedophiles could use computers to alter images of actual children in ways that obscure the true
identity of the “actual” child and make it akin to a “virtual” image. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at § IV.
Thus, any pedophile with a computer and readily available off-the-shelf software can efficiently
subvert a child pornography law that only prohibits images of verifiably real children. Id
Second, the harm inflicted on American children is real, regardless of whether the images that
look real are only virtual images. Id The very existence of a market for such realistic images is
the source of harm to our children, because pedophiles can use child pornography to seduce
children into abusive situations Our interest in eradicating child pornography should not be any
less powerful in instances where actual children are not used in the production of an image
simply because the harm will accrue later in time.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that this Court REVERSE the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the questions of the
constitutionality of the statutory language “appears to be” and “conveys the impression.

Respectfully submitted.

Counsel for Petitioners
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